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Abstract
This article addresses the debate over religion in the public sphere by analysing the conception of
‘religion’ in the recent work of Habermas, who claims to mediate the divide between those who
defend public appeals to religion without restriction and those who place limits on such appeals. I
argue that Habermas’ translation requirement and his restriction on religious reasons in the
institutional public sphere rest on a conception of religion as essentially apolitical in its origin.
This conception, I argue, remains embedded in a standard secularization framework, despite
Habermas’ claim to offer a new account of secularization. This approach betrays the complex
reality of the political constitution of religion and the religious constitution of politics, as
demonstrated by the current debate about marriage rights in the USA. In mischaracterizing the
inherently public and political dimensions of religion, Habermas undermines the effectiveness of
his normative framework.
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Deliberative democracy has a religion problem. The shared perspective called for by
deliberative approaches – whether articulated in terms of reciprocity, an overlapping
consensus, or communicative rationality – coexists uneasily with the religious convic-
tions, language and forms of activism that have marked democracy in the USA and
elsewhere in recent decades. Political views framed and defended in religious terms
seem incapable of being shared by others or serving as the grounds for agreement, as
deliberative theories demand. As a result, the primary solution among deliberative
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theorists has been to argue that citizens, for the most part, should limit their appeals to
religious reasons in the public sphere.
In this article, I explore whether deliberative democracy’s religion problem is largely
one of its own making, stemming from the way that it conceptualizes religion. In treating
religion primarily in terms of inaccessible epistemological claims, theories of delibera-
tive democracy end up conceptualizing religion as apolitical in its essence, an approach
rooted in a classic secularization framework. On this view, religion is imagined as a more
or less autonomous area of life that appears as an occasional interloper on democratic
politics, rather than as something that is fundamentally constituted by and through
politics. This approach means that theories of deliberative democracy create an irresol-
vable problem for themselves: their presumption that religion is essentially apolitical
creates the possibility that democratic deliberation can be fundamentally areligious,
which becomes an implicit or explicit standard for the legitimate outcomes of democratic
deliberation. The re-emergence of religion in public life, then, gets articulated as the
failure of religiously based political speech and action to fit deliberative standards of
legitimacy.
I develop this case through an analysis of the work of Habermas, who has recently
claimed to mediate the divide between, on the one hand, those who defend public appeals
to religious reasons more or less without restriction and, on the other hand, those who
place limits on such appeals (2008: 119). In particular, Habermas has criticized Rawls’
approach to public reason and its restrictions on public appeals to religious beliefs, and
he has offered an alternative account that takes seriously the insights of public reason
critics like Nicholas Wolterstorff (Audi and Wolterstorff, 1997) and Paul Weithman
(2002). In so doing, Habermas offers a new understanding of secularization as a mutual
learning process, one he seeks to distinguish from traditional notions of secularization.
Despite the appeal of Habermas’ approach, I argue that it remains embedded in a
standard secularization framework and that, as a result, he understands religion as essen-
tially apolitical, something that exists outside of the political realm. This approach
betrays the complex reality of the political constitution of religion and the religious con-
stitution of politics, especially in the United States, as demonstrated by the current debate
about marriage rights. In this way, Habermas’ normative approach presumes an image of
religion that, in mischaracterizing its inherently public and political dimensions, ends up
undermining the effectiveness of his normative framework.
Habermas on religion and the public sphere
Habermas criticizes Rawls, in essence, for failing to take the religious liberty of religious
citizens seriously enough in demanding that such citizens have a moral responsibility to
justify their political convictions independently of their religious ones (Rawls, 1993:
224). Habermas acknowledges, following Wolterstorff, that religious citizens may not
be able to find compelling non-religious reasons for their social and political views,
given that their religiously grounded conceptions of justice tell them what is politically
right and wrong (Audi and Wolterstorff, 1997: 105). A liberal approach cannot require
these citizens to justify their political convictions independently of their religious ones,
since this would violate the very rights that liberalism claims to protect. Moreover, since
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under Habermas’ theory the deliberative mode of democratic will-formation demands
the equal participation of all citizens, requiring religious citizens to proffer secular rea-
sons for their views would violate equality and lead to illegitimate outcomes (2008: 128).
Thus his theory must somehow accommodate religious reasons in public.
Habermas, however, goes beyond merely accommodating religious citizens. He also
argues that religious traditions potentially make unique and positive contributions to public
discourse and secular philosophy. For example, in their articulations and embodiments of
forms of goodness and exemplary lives, religious traditions potentially preserve things that
philosophy does not currently provide. Habermas concedes that while western philosophy
has historically assimilated Christian truths and concepts, it has not exhausted their mean-
ings. He argues that these meanings can be cultural resources for solidarity against
encroaching market and administrative power; in this way, religion can be an ally in resist-
ing system domination (Habermas and Ratzinger, 2006: 45–6; Habermas, 2008: 111). In
addition, Habermas claims, religious traditions have a unique ability to articulate moral
intuitions, especially with regard to ‘vulnerable forms of communal life’. To the extent that
these insights have not yet been conceptualized by philosophy, religion can assist the strug-
gle for justice by articulating these moral insights in the public sphere (2008: 131–2).1
However, since he is not satisfied with a mere modus vivendi approach to democracy,
Habermas cannot simply side altogether with Wolterstorff, who argues that all liberal
democracy needs to succeed is the ‘fairly gained and fairly executed agreement of the
majority’ on particular policies (Audi and Wolterstorff, 1997: 114). Habermas’ normative
vision of deliberative democracy instead links civic solidarity with the rational acceptabil-
ity of democratic decisions, in which citizens understand themselves as the authors of laws
under which they live. Thus, only policies that can be accepted by all those affected as par-
ticipants in rational discourse are legitimate (ibid.: 107). Habermas, then, is in a difficult
spot: he wants a robust notion of religious liberty that accords religious citizens full equal-
ity and does not cut public discourse off from the resources religious traditions may have to
offer, but he also wants the policy and law outcomes of democratic decision-making to be
grounded in public reasons that are accessible to all, a standard that religious reasons, in his
view, generally fail to meet. His solution is to distinguish between the informal public
sphere of democratic opinion-formation, on the one hand, and the institutional decision-
making public sphere (legislatures and courts, for example), on the other. Habermas claims
that religious citizens should be free to express and justify their political views in religious
language in the informal sphere. However, ‘those who hold a public office or are candi-
dates for such’, and thus operate within the institutional public sphere, ‘have a duty to
remain neutral among competing worldviews’ (2008: 128). In other words, coercive pol-
icies must be based solely on secular reasons, not on religious reasons or language, even
though religious language can contribute to democratic opinion-formation. This division
of the public sphere, in Habermas’ view, solves the dilemma of protecting the equality and
liberty of religious citizens and remaining open to the resources religious traditions offer,
while also grounding the legitimacy of law in public reasons accessible to all.
One of Habermas’ concerns is that Rawlsian public reason imposes unequal burdens
of citizenship on religious and non-religious citizens. Habermas attempts to mitigate this
problem by specifying mutual burdens for religious and non-religious citizens as part of
secularization, which he characterizes in terms of a complementary learning process.
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Under this approach, religious citizens must abide by what he calls the ‘institutional
translation proviso’: they can use religious language and reasons in the informal public
sphere as long as they accept that only secular reasons count in the institutions of
government and, thus, their religious reasons are subject to translation.2 Habermas does
not require that believers themselves provide the translation, only that they make a good
faith effort to recognize themselves as authors of laws by connecting their own religious
convictions to the secular reasons used to justify the laws. For the religious citizen, as
Habermas puts it, ‘this only calls for the epistemic ability to consider one’s own religious
convictions reflexively from the outside and to connect them with secular views’.
Secular citizens, as their part of the bargain, must ‘cooperate in producing a translation’
(2008: 130). In other words, both religious and non-religious citizens are called upon to
work jointly on the task of translation and to maintain the threshold separating the infor-
mal public sphere from the institutional public sphere.
Habermas also makes broader epistemic demands of both religious and non-religious
citizens. Given the fact of pluralism, Habermas argues, religious communities must
engage in hermeneutical self-reflection in order to develop an epistemic stance toward
the claims of other religions and worldviews, toward secular knowledge, especially
scientific expertise, and toward the priority of secular reasons in the political arena.
As part of this, religious citizens must distinguish their role as citizens from their role
as religious adherents, in part by eschewing dogmatism and respecting freedom of
conscience. Non-religious citizens also bear a cognitive burden. They must work to over-
come a ‘rigid and exclusive secularist self-understanding of modernity’ and may not
question the right of religious citizens to contribute to public arguments in religious lan-
guage (2008: 137–9). Moreover, non-religious citizens can be expected to help ‘translate
relevant contributions from religious language into a publicly intelligible language’
(ibid.: 113). This entails viewing their political disagreements with religious citizens
as reasonable and expected, not merely the result of irrationality on the part of the
religious believer. This ‘agnostic, but non-reductionist form of postmetaphysical think-
ing’ refrains from passing judgment on religious truth and rejects a narrow conception of
reason that excludes religious doctrines from reason’s genealogy, even while it continues
to insist on a strict demarcation between faith and knowledge. In other words, postme-
taphysical thinking of this sort must adopt a self-reflexive, critical stance toward the
limits of enlightenment, similar to the self-reflexive, critical stance that religious citizens
must take toward the limits of the truth-claims of their religious traditions (ibid.: 140).
Habermas acknowledges that under this approach the burdens of citizenship may still
remain somewhat unequal for believer and unbeliever. He argues that for the religious
citizen, the good is prior to the right, where the divine perspective from which one claims
to operate deems other ways of life not just different but mistaken. For a non-religious
citizen with ‘light metaphysical baggage’, however, the right has priority over the good.
These citizens see democracy and the protection of human rights as paramount; beyond
that, plural ways of life generate no cognitive dissonance for them (2008: 262–4). In this
way, the worldview of the non-religious citizen substantially overlaps with the tenets of
liberalism itself. As a result, unequal burdens are unavoidable, though Habermas believes
that his approach reduces the imbalance relative to other public reason approaches because
of the demands he makes of non-religious citizens. In a postmetaphysical democracy, both
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religious and non-religious citizens must adopt reflexive and critical stances toward their
own convictions, and each must maintain an openness toward the other.
Religious and secular reasons in the marriage debate
Habermas tries to solve the problem that religion poses for deliberative democracy by
allowing religious reasons as part of the opinion-forming public sphere but allowing only
generally accessible or secular reasons in decision-making institutions and as the basis of
policy.3 At the heart of this scheme is his translation requirement. In his view, translation
allows for robust religious liberty in a way that also continues to meet his standard of
having citizens understand themselves as the authors of laws under which they live. This
is, in some respects, an appealing vision, based on a welcome recognition that merely
circumscribing religious reasons in the public sphere fails to account for the reality of
the public presence of religion in democratic politics. And yet, as others have argued,
it is not clear that it actually solves the problem of exclusion for religious citizens. Cris-
tina Lafont argues that Habermas’ notion of translation assumes that it is possible to
come to the same conclusions through different epistemic means – that is, that there
is an equivalence between particular religiously based political reasons and particular
non-religiously based political reasons. This fails to account for genuine conflicts
between religious and secular reasons, situations where no translation can be made.
Lafont thinks such situations do occur in politics, and, when they do, Habermas’ trans-
lation proviso leaves religious citizens in more or less the same position as Rawls’
approach does: they would be excluded from understanding themselves as co-authors
of the policies that emerge (2009: 135). Similarly, Melissa Yates argues that, while
Habermas asks both religious and non-religious citizens to maintain cognitive openness,
only religious citizens on his account must also somehow split their religious identities
from their public identities, just as Rawls demands (2007: 888).
Lafont and Yates are right to be concerned about the translation requirement;
nonetheless, their criticisms share with Habermas the assumption that religious reasons
are readily distinguishable from secular reasons employed in the public sphere. There are
causes to question this assumption, however, based on the inherently public and political
nature of religious and theological claims themselves. As Wolterstorff argues, theologi-
cal claims refer not only to a restricted set of ‘religious’ issues important for the individ-
ual believer in his or her personal life, such as the nature of God and the soul, how to
please God, and how to attain eternal life. Rather, they also have to do with
this-worldly social and political concerns like the nature of justice, equality and freedom
in particular contexts. Theology, then, is public in the sense that it addresses issues of
common concern. It is an ongoing attempt to speak from a religious community and
to bring the resources of its tradition to bear on collective matters, not just for those who
identify with the religious community, though this may be its primary audience, but for
broader communities as well, depending on the issue. This means that theology can
potentially contribute to civic discourse, as Weithman contends (2002: 50). To define
religious discourse in advance as not part of the public sphere ignores this contribution,
as Habermas recognizes.
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Theological claims are also public in a second sense, one that Habermas enacts in his
engagement with theologians but draws little attention to in his theory. Theology not
only addresses public concerns but also takes place, in various ways, in public. Like any
other discipline, academic theology is not confined to seminaries and religious univer-
sities but is carried out through conferences, journals, books, speeches, online
discussions, professional associations, and so forth. Though the language and practices
of a specific religious tradition might limit the reach of theological debates, they are not
exclusively ‘in-house’, restricted activities. In addition, priests, clerics, rabbis, preachers
and other religious leaders reproduce and refract theological insights in their pronounce-
ments to, and conversations with, lay members. Although here, too, the primary audience
may be the members of a religious community, other ‘publics’ are also often addressed.
As Weithman argues, this becomes clear when we reconceptualize the ‘public’ not in
terms of a particular space but as a particular kind of occasion, one in which a statement,
first, is intended to be known and actually made available to others and, second, involves
a commitment to certain outcomes, creating legitimate expectations of one’s behavior
(2002: 95–101).4
Moreover, theological arguments do not remain confined to the occasion of their
pronouncement, since political leaders and activists associated with particular religious
traditions frequently take them up and reproduce them in other contexts as well. In these
contexts, the theological claims under discussion are open to questioning, contestation
and revision, not just by those who identify with the tradition, but by those outside of
the tradition as well. As religious communities have adopted new mass communication
technologies – radio, television and, especially, the internet – their theological conversa-
tions are increasingly available to anyone who wants to pay attention, and they can be
taken up by anyone who cares about the issues to which they speak. Religious and
theological views, then, are not forged in isolation. Instead, they are made and remade
in connection with, and in opposition to, others, both those who identify with the
tradition in question and those outside of it. These views, then, are partly a product of
their social and political contexts, and as such they are generally accessible to citizens
who may not share them. This is an obvious point, but one that is often forgotten in dis-
cussions among political theorists about whether religious reasons belong in democratic
deliberation. The presumption seems to be that religious reasons arise from a distinct
area of human life and then are directed toward political matters, rather than taking shape
as part of the social and political world.
This is illustrated by the issue of marriage rights for same-sex couples, an issue
currently or recently on the political agenda in many democracies and one that is partic-
ularly divisive in the US context.5 In the US debate, it is common to see activists for
marriage equality take up theological claims about sexuality or marriage made by reli-
gious leaders and activists who oppose marriage rights for same-sex couples. Though
sometimes the activists supporting same-sex marriage will dismiss any theological
claims outright, in other cases they will address the claims on the tradition’s own terms.
They might, for example, contest the interpretation of a passage from a sacred text, offer
other texts as counter-evidence, or argue that the stated view violates another of the tra-
dition’s core commitments. The reverse also happens, as religious thinkers and activists
who oppose same-sex marriage take up the arguments of pro-gay thinkers and activists.6
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These exchanges are not always a model of reasoned discourse, to be sure, but this does
not negate the fact that religious and theological reflections are often articulated and
applied in the context of broader debates with those outside the religious tradition in
question.
In fact, as the debate over marriage in the USA highlights, religious communities
would not articulate certain theological claims at all in the absence of particular cultural,
social, or political developments. Though one can find condemnations of sexual
practices between members of the same sex far back in the history of Christian theology
(McNeill, 1976), these doctrines and the biblical texts they draw on necessarily get
reinterpreted in the face of a more or less new demand, state recognition of same-sex
relationships. American Christians opposed to marriage rights for same-sex couples find
themselves having to defend heterosexual marriage in ways that were, for the most part,
unnecessary just a decade ago. This development, in turn, opens up the possibility of
calling into question, say, whether present-day heterosexual marriage in fact reflects a
‘Christian’ or ‘biblical’ approach to marriage. Theological claims are revisited and
revised, and in the process the identities of religious traditions are themselves renarrated.
As a result, for some conservative American Christian denominations and churches,
opposition to gay marriage has in a very short time become a defining feature of their
collective identities and an orthodoxy standard against which other Christian groups are
measured.7 Within other traditions, like the worldwide Anglican communion, issues
surrounding same-sex relationships remain at the core of a struggle to construct and
claim the tradition’s identity.
The same is true, of course, with respect to abortion. Here, too, theology, politics and
the identity of a religious community are all tied up with each other, as religious leaders
and citizens apply and reformulate their theologies in new political contexts. During the
2004 US presidential campaign, for example, certain members of the Roman Catholic
clergy announced that they would refuse to administer the Eucharist to John Kerry and
other pro-choice, Roman Catholic politicians.8 Now, in one sense this may have been
simply an exercise of proper ecclesiastical authority,9 since as a basic matter of religious
liberty in the USA the Roman Catholic Church has the right to make doctrinal decisions
about who may and may not partake of the sacrament, what steps are necessary before
partaking, and what the consequences are for those who do not meet these requirements.
However, in focusing on the issue of abortion, the bishops were also participating in an
effort to define what it means to be (a good) Roman Catholic, one necessitated in their
view by particular political and social developments. Moreover, announcing this stand in
the midst of a presidential campaign represented a public effort to define what it means
to be a citizen of a certain sort – a Roman Catholic citizen, at minimum, but perhaps more
broadly, a citizen of faith, or even just a morally upright citizen. Others, like Catholics
for Free Choice, resisted this effort, arguing that (good) Catholics could vote for
pro-choice politicians (Wakin, 2004). The bishops, activist groups and other lay Roman
Catholics are all in this case engaged in the struggle to define the nature of Roman
Catholicism and to claim the mantles of good believer and good citizen, a struggle that
is unavoidably public and political.10
This complex intertwining of theology, religious identity and politics makes it
difficult, I would argue, to disentangle ‘religious’ from ‘secular’ reasons, especially in
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a way that correlates to an inaccessible versus accessible divide. This is especially clear
in the marriage debate. Certainly, sophisticated faith-based interest groups and advocates
can present public arguments that make few direct references to God, sacred texts, a
Church’s teaching, or anything else that is prima facie ‘religious’. In fact, some have
become quite adept at it. For example, the National Organization for Marriage, one of the
leading groups opposing same-sex marriage, publishes a pamphlet entitled ‘WhyMarriage
Matters’. Though it opens with quotes from the biblical books of Genesis and Mark, the
pamphlet quickly moves to a set of arguments for marriage drawn from what it claims is
‘a large body of social science research’. These include the fact that marriage is correlated
with lower poverty rates, with longer, happier and healthier lives of spouses, and with
children who are happier and have higher educational achievements. The pamphlet then
offers a set of reasons against same-sex marriage, including the following: it will lead to
polygamy, it will lead to violations of religious liberty and it will lead to teaching about gay
sex in public schools (National Organization for Marriage, 2009b). None of these, on their
face, are obviously ‘religious’ reasons. Aside from the introductory paragraph, there are no
references toGod, sacred texts, or the teachingsof aChurch.Their ‘TalkingPoints’webpage
is similarly devoid of religious references and appears designed, in fact, to discourage its
member activists from employing explicitly religious claims in public discourse; the
document urges them, instead, to argue that maintaining exclusively heterosexual marriage
is just ‘common sense’ (National Organization for Marriage, 2009a).
Likewise, arguments against same-sex marriage from the op-ed pages of major news-
papers and magazines rarely draw on explicitly theological reasons. In a Wall Street
Journal op-ed piece, for example, Robert George argues that marriage is a distinctive
form of union by virtue of its being ‘founded, unlike other friendships, on bodily unity
of the kind that sometimes generates new life’. Thus, redefining marriage to include
same-sex unions will, according to George, undermine ‘its connection to organic bodily
union – and thus to procreation’, even though not all heterosexual unions are ‘generative
in effect’ (2009: A11). Though George’s Roman Catholic theological commitments are
well known, the argument directly invokes no theological doctrines or reasons.
Similarly, a piece in the conservative magazine The Weekly Standard argues that,
because heterosexual marriages play a unique role in the ‘kinship system’ that cannot
be replicated by same-sex marriages, the latter will inevitably fail and should, therefore,
not be allowed (Schulman, 2009). The legitimacy or illegitimacy of its anthropological
claims notwithstanding, the argument is not on its face a religious one.
On Habermas’ terms, it is difficult to know what to make of these arguments. Perhaps
he would simply regard them as translations of religious reasons into secular reasons.
Certainly, claims from social science research about the social and psychological effects
of heterosexual marriage, or allegations about what would or would not have to be taught
to public school students, could more easily be shared by non-religious citizens than nar-
row theological claims along the lines of ‘God forbids same-sex marriage’. To the extent
that religious citizens can recognize the former as some of their own reasons, even if not
their only ones, we could regard this as a kind of translation. Moreover, in Habermas’
view, we need not worry about whether these are their actual reasons or merely reasons
they choose to offer. According to him, while the motivations of citizens ‘may be
relevant for a moral judgment of the citizen’, it is only the manifest reasons that have
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to do with ‘maintaining a liberal political culture’ and have implications for democratic
opinion-formation (2008: 126).11
At the same time, ‘translation’ does not seem like the right concept for describing
these contributions to the public debate about same-sex marriage. Translation implies
an equivalence of some sort. When we attempt to translate a statement from one lan-
guage into another, for example, the task is oriented toward conveying the same meaning
in the second language, even though there is, of course, an interpretive dimension to any
translation. But the above arguments are not really religious arguments restated in non-
religious terms. There is not an equivalent meaning simply expressed in two different
ways. Instead, the given arguments are facially non-religious reasons that are situated
within broader theological-cum-political visions. In fact, the stated reasons make the
most sense, and are most compelling, when one also knows these broader visions. More-
over, such contextualized arguments would in many respects be more accessible to one
who does not share these visions than the stripped-down versions offered. For example, a
non-religious citizen likely could more easily understand and even be sympathetic to
George’s argument about the potentially generative effects of heterosexual marriage if
the theological context of this argument were made explicit.
Of course, these arguments against same-sex marriage are part of the informal public
sphere. Based on Habermas’ approach, such arguments may be expressed in explicitly
religious terms – indeed, we may even lose something if they are not sometimes
expressed in this way – as long as these reasons are translated before entry into the
institutional public sphere. But a look at actual arguments in the institutional public
sphere suggests that similar problems arise here as well.
In the USA, it is only within the last few years that same-sex marriage rights have
been explicitly considered in legislative bodies, rather than only in the courts.12 Given
the chance to express their views and their reasons for these views on this issue, state
legislators frequently employed explicitly religious language and reasons. In fact, it is
rather surprising how much religious language and reasons permeated these debates.
In the Maine legislature, for example, the statements of legislators opposing same-sex
marriage invoked, among others: ‘traditional marriage’ as rooted in ‘established
religion’ and dictated by specific passages from the Bible (Rep. Burns); the fact that God
created gender diversity, which is perfectly reflected in heterosexual marriage (Rep. Thi-
bodeau); and that same-sex marriage is known to be wrong based on the ‘good book’ and
knowledge drawn from ‘the deepest part of my soul’ (Rep. Briggs).13 These claims were
intermixed with other, less obviously religious claims that homosexuality is ‘innately
aberrant’ and against ‘natural law’ (Rep. Ayotte), that procreation is the purpose of mar-
riage (Rep. Bickford), that heterosexual marriage is the foundation of society and chang-
ing it will result in decline (Rep. Chase, Sen. Weston), that no civilization in history has
endorsed same-sex marriage, and that most Maine residents oppose it (Rep. Celli).
But facially religious arguments were not monopolized by opponents of same-sex
marriage. In addition to arguments on the grounds of equality and non-discrimination,
proponents also invoked claims, among others, that ‘God is a God of love’ (Rep. Carey),
that the Bible commands one to ‘do justice’ and ‘love mercy’ (Sen. Mitchell), that one’s
church supports the bill (Sen. Rector), and that ‘God loves those who love others’ (Sen.
Nutting). Beyond giving specific reasons, moreover, legislators on both sides of the issue
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frequently provided context for their remarks by citing current and past church
memberships and leadership positions, and by offering personal narratives that included
references to religious and non-religious family histories, rejection or acceptance of gay
children, parents and friends by religious bodies, and, frequently, their own marriages,
especially inter-faith and inter-racial ones. The back-and-forth of deliberation suggests
that no one has trouble understanding, responding to, or even sharing the arguments
given. Moreover, removing the ‘religious’ reasons from this debate would remove much
of its substance. It would require excising much of the personal narratives, and perhaps
nearly everything that Iris Marion Young defended as the rhetorical dimension of
deliberation (2000: 65–6). In the Maine case, we would be left with a small handful
of appeals to non-discrimination, equality and majority opinion. These may more closely
fit a deliberative standard of grounds that all can reasonably be expected to share, but it is
unlikely that the end result would be greater legitimacy of the policy outcome, or a
greater sense among those involved in the decision and those represented by them that
their voices had been heard and taken seriously.
Habermas’ translation requirement depends on a distinction between ‘religious’ and
‘secular’ language and reasons that he presumes would be at least somewhat straightfor-
ward. However, arguments about same-sex marriage in the USA suggest that the
distinction not only is not necessarily easy to make, but also is likely to be not that useful
when it comes to questions of legitimacy. In this case, the views and identities of reli-
gious citizens are produced not just in the context of, but also because of and by means
of, political debate and action. As such, they are inherently and thoroughly political
viewpoints and reasons, both in origin and in object. But they are also religious
viewpoints and reasons, both in origin and in object, in that the responses to political
developments are drawn in part from the resources of a religious community, are meant
to inform and enable members of that community, and simultaneously transform both the
theological reasons and the identity of the community itself. In this way, the translation
requirement largely fails to do justice to the religious dimensions of politics and the
political dimensions of religious beliefs, identities and practices.
Secularizations old and new
Part of the problem with Habermas’ approach is that he gives few details as to what
translation as part of democratic deliberation would look like. Rather than address the
specific question of how religious reasons and language can be translated into grounds
that can be recognized as legitimate by all, including religious believers themselves,
Habermas’ discussion of translation primarily focuses on how insights can be gleaned
from religion and theology, which seems to be his primary concern. In fact, Habermas
tends to equate the mining of religion’s resources with the ‘translation’ of religious
reasons into secular reasons. In a conversation with Eduardo Mendieta, for example,
Habermas says that there remain religious meanings ‘that philosophy has not yet fully
exhausted, has not yet translated into the language of the public, that is of presumptively
generally convincing, reasons’ (Habermas, 2002: 162). ‘Translation’ is here equated
with ‘exhaust[ing]’ the meanings and resources religion has to offer, a process that
involves conversion into the ‘language of the public’. This formulation implies that
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religious language is not already part of the language of the public, and it also suggests
that its translation into public language is not an outcome of political discourse itself but
a task carried out by philosophy. Philosophers mine religion for its resources and make
them available for public use. Elsewhere, Habermas suggests that philosophy and theol-
ogy jointly enable the translation of religious reasons into public reasons (ibid.: 74–6).14
The purpose of Habermas’ translation requirement appears to be less about ensuring
that religious citizens have full religious liberty and can recognize themselves as authors
of the laws under which they live, and more about the mining of theological resources for
public benefit. This helps explain why Habermas focuses so much on the kind of religion
appropriate for postsecular democracy rather than on the political practices and
institutions that would enable the translation he calls for. Habermas’ requirements for
acceptable postmetaphysical religion, I suggest, reveal the extent to which his account
remains tied to a traditional secularization framework that sees religion as apolitical
in its essence.
Though the specifics of traditional secularization theory have long been contested,
most versions include some combination of the following: (1) the differentiation of
society into separate spheres (the economy, education, the family, leisure, and so forth);
(2) the privatization of religion, as its public authority recedes in the face of new author-
ities like science, reason and the market; and (3) the decline of individual religious belief
and practice (Casanova, 1994). Formuch of the 20th century, these elements were taken to
be inherently related as part of a single process thatmodernizing societies undergo, but this
view has increasingly been called into question.15 Societies havemodernized in all sorts of
ways, even while substantial percentages of their populations have continued their reli-
gious beliefs and practices. Moreover, the past few decades have shown that religious
adherents inmodern societies do not necessarily confine religious authority to private life.
Increasingly, the broader theory has been abandoned, with the particular elements viewed
as distinct phenomena that may ormay not bemanifested at particular times and places. In
a 1991 essay, Habermas admits that, like others, his earlier work too easily accepted the
premises of classic secularization theory, presuming that religion would be privatized and
religious worldviews would disappear, leaving behind a secular ethics of responsibility.
But now he realizes that these must remain open questions for social scientists and
philosophers, and that the ‘process of a critical appropriation of the essential contents
of religious tradition is still underway and the outcome is difficult to predict’ (2002: 79).
However, a closer look at his approach to religion suggests he has not moved substan-
tially away from a classic secularization framework. On more than one occasion,
Habermas describes religion as originally a ‘worldview’ or a ‘comprehensive doctrine’
in the sense that it ‘claims the authority to structure a form of life in its entirety’ (2008:
261, 111; original emphasis; see also Habermas and Ratzinger, 2006: 48). But, Habermas
argues, it is precisely this comprehensive claim of authority that is problematic in a plur-
alist, democratic society, and so religion ‘must renounce this claim to structure life in a
comprehensive way’. Moreover, in order to avoid a situation of competing loyalties, the
religious tradition must develop convincing reasons for supporting this renunciation
‘from the perspective of the religion itself’ (2008: 261; original emphasis). In other
words, a religious tradition must accept differentiation and its limited authority not just
as an unavoidable fact of modern life – one that, perhaps, it seeks to reverse in certain
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respects – but as part of its own theology. The kind of religion suited for democratic
participation in a postsecular society, in Habermas’ view, is one that significantly
renounces its own authority to provide a broader political and social vision. Only reli-
gious citizens who have internalized this limited role for their religious beliefs can appro-
priately participate in the public sphere.
Thus, despite his effort to distance himself from traditional secularization theory,
Habermas’ theory best fits those religious traditions that already accept as part of their
collective self-image the role assigned to religion under classic secularization: religion
as a personal belief system. This can be seen in the contrast Habermas draws between
what he calls ‘modern faith’, the kind of reflexive religion suited to postsecular democ-
racy, on the one hand, and fundamentalism, on the other. Fundamentalist groups, he
argues, ‘persist in practicing or promoting a return to the exclusivity of pre-modern
religious attitudes’, rather than accepting modern differentiation. But since such a return
is impossible, fundamentalism will remain a ‘false answer’ to the problems posed by a
pluralist society (2002: 151). Habermas casts fundamentalism as nostalgia for a traditional,
pre-modern world and a refusal to accept the differentiated authorities of modern society.
Such convictions, he argues elsewhere, cannot be reconciled with the mentality necessary
‘if a democratic polity is not to disintegrate’ (2008: 3). Habermas aligns ‘modern faith’, in
contrast, with reflexivity, the recognition of its limited scope, and the embracing of
pluralism. Fundamentalisms seemingly have little value for postsecular philosophy and
politics, while modern faiths may still contain resources that can be mined.
Contrast this understanding of fundamentalism with that of Olivier Roy in his recent
study of Islam and secularism. Roy argues that it is a mistake to view fundamentalism ‘as
the reactivation of the religious dimension of a traditional culture’ (2007: 61). Rather
than a desire to return to a pre-modern world where religion and culture are one, funda-
mentalism is instead an attempt to separate faith from its surrounding cultures and define
it as ‘pure religion’ through a system of codes and rules. On these terms, religion is cast
as a global essence, not something tied to or bound by particular cultural manifestations
or historical contingencies (2004: 23–4; 2007: 9). Fundamentalism, then, is not just a
reaction to, much less a rejection of, modernity, but is made possible by it and
participates in its development, especially in its globalizing efforts. Roy thus draws a
very different contrast than Habermas does, not between pre-modern and modern faiths
but between fundamentalists and Islamists. Fundamentalists see personal piety as the
means of true communal faith, whereas Islamists see communal transformation as com-
ing by means of the state. For Islamists, Roy argues, mere fundamentalism is inadequate
because the modern state dominates so much of life. Under these conditions, the state by
its very existence threatens the community of the faithful unless the state is taken over by
the faithful and transformed into an Islamic state. Both movements, in Roy’s view, are
thoroughly modern, but they differ in their stance toward political power.
Talal Asad offers a similar analysis. His work historicizes the concepts of ‘religion’
and the ‘secular’ and uncovers how these concepts are tied up with power, nationalism
and the state.16 In his book Formations of the Secular, Asad presents the secular as a
concept that brings together certain practices, knowledges and sensibilities, which in turn
constitute and regulate social and political identities. The practices and knowledges that
constitute the modern secular, however, are largely hidden by its representation as a
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neutral or natural space left over after religion has receded from public life. In this way,
the secular is presented not only as religion’s successor and its opposite, but also as the
ground that was really there all along, needing only to be revealed after the layers of reli-
gion, superstition and tradition have been peeled back.17 The secular and the religious,
thus, are part of a larger conceptual map according to which religion functions as mere
private belief, and any engagement in public talk on its part must be trivial and make few
demands (Asad, 2003: 16–17). Modern religion, in other words, is constituted as belief
about those areas of life not absorbed by the secular, the real.
Like Roy, Asad argues that because the modern state structures and regulates so much
of life – ‘even the most intimate, such as birth and death’ – it is impossible to avoid
encountering its power. Law and administration define and regulate social spaces,
practices, identities and relationships in such a way that these become inherently politi-
cized. So, Asad claims, to the extent that religious communities also seek to regulate or
alter these spaces, practices, identities and relationships, such communities unavoidably
represent ‘deprivatized’ religion that violates the terms of modern secularism. ‘Religion’
in these cases is seen as entering a space already occupied by the secular. In the case of
Islamists, Asad concludes: ‘Islamism’s preoccupation with state power is the result not
of its commitment to nationalist ideas but of the modern nation-state’s enforced claim to
constitute legitimate social identities and arenas. No movement that aspires to more than
mere belief or inconsequential talk in public can remain indifferent to state power in a
secular world’ (2003: 199–200).18
The analyses of Roy and Asad help us see the extent to which Habermas relies on an
already depoliticized concept of ‘religion’ and a corresponding understanding of the public
sphere as secular, both of which remain situated in the modern imaginary Asad spells
out.19 On Habermas’ terms, fundamentalists are either confused about the nature of reli-
gion or refuse to accept its limits. By contrast, modern, reflexive religions accept their lim-
ited role, and, therefore, can properly participate in the (informal) public sphere, providing
resources that can be mined by philosophy and made fitting for entry into the fully secular
realm of the institutional public sphere. However, both of Habermas’ types – modern and
fundamentalist faiths – are already specified in terms of a conceptual framework that sees
the secular as the real and religion as a distinct, less real, area of life, with the types differ-
ing only in the extent to which they claim authority to shape communal life. Unlike Roy
and Asad, Habermas does not sufficiently consider the ways that state power and politics
already constitute and contain religion. Rather, he imagines the varying claims to authority
made by modern and fundamentalist faiths as arising from a distinct area of life.
When theorizing the place of religion in democracy, then, Habermas frames the
question in terms of whether religious reasons and language should be allowed into the
public sphere and, if so, to what extent and on what terms. Roy and Asad, by contrast, ask
how what we call ‘religion’ is already politically constituted and reconstituted, a process
that is tied up with the nature of the modern state and its effects in constructing and
regulating social identities, practices and relationships. The limits of framing the ques-
tion as Habermas does are shown by the example I discussed above. Since the debate
over marriage in the USA has to do with defining and regulating identities and relation-
ships, it is not surprising that religious communities and citizens would regard these as
matters that touch on core principles and practices. In various ways, religious traditions
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also define and regulate these same identities and relationships, so efforts to redefine
these are seen, rightly or wrongly, as an encroachment. Their efforts to resist, or partic-
ipate in, redefinition are to be expected. To attempt to separate secular from religious
reasons in this context, and to attempt to restrict the latter in certain respects, as Haber-
mas does, is to impose a framework that fails to capture the already intertwined nature of
religion and politics.
This is not to argue that deliberative theories of democracy should be abandoned for a
modus vivendi approach. Instead, I think that such theories, including Habermas’, have the
theoretical resources to fully incorporate religious discourse and language.20 However, this
would require conceptualizing religion in ways that incorporate its inherently public and
political dimensions, rather than treating it primarily as private belief. The recent legisla-
tive debates over same-sex marriage in the USA suggest that the various, overlapping and
sometimes competing claims to define and regulate social identities and relationships
made by the state and by various religious traditions have to be worked out through delib-
eration, not just in the informal public sphere but at times in the institutional public sphere
as well. An a priori prohibition on religious reasons in the institutional public sphere
already decides these questions on the side of the state: it alone can regulate and define
these identities and relationships. At least in democracies marked by high levels of
religious belief and practice among citizens, where religious identities are made and
remade publicly and politically, such issues will not be worked out in satisfying ways if
religious reasons and language are deemed out of bounds from the outset. Rather than
seeking to protect the public sphere from religious citizens and activists, deliberative
theorists should encourage their engagement with others in the public realm itself. Only
through such engagement can religious and non-religious citizens hope to produce delib-
erative outcomes that allow both groups to see themselves as authors of the policies and
laws under which they live. Moreover, only such engagement would provide full access
to whatever resources religious traditions and communities may have to offer postsecular
democracies, as Habermas desires. His translation requirement and the threshold between
the informal and institutional public sphere, premised on a flawed conception of religion,
actually stand in the way of his goal of fully drawing on these resources.
Notes
For comments on earlier versions of this article, I thank Simone Chambers, Clarence Joldersma,
Andrew Murphy, Amit Ron, Melissa Williams, and participants in the 2009–10 Fellows’
Seminar at the Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto.
1. See Chambers for a summary of how Habermas envisions religion contributing to postmeta-
physical philosophy and politics (2007: 214–18).
2. Habermas takes a hard line on the inadmissibility of untranslated religious reasons in the insti-
tutional public sphere, even to the point of claiming that, in parliament, ‘the rules of procedure
must empower the house leader to strike religious positions or justifications from the official
transcript. The truth contents of religious contributions can enter into the institutionalized
practice of deliberation and decision-making only when the necessary translation already
occurs in the pre-parliamentarian domain, i.e. in the political public sphere itself’ (2008: 131).
3. Habermas equates ‘generally accessible’ and ‘secular’ (Habermas, 2008: 132).
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4. Weithman illustrates this with the example of a 1998 homily by Cardinal O’Connor that
included criticisms of a Domestic Partnership Act under consideration by the New York City
Council. The cardinal, Weithman notes, temporarily instantiated a public forum, even though
his speech was from a pulpit and to a congregation of believers, generally considered part of
the ‘private’ realm (2002: 111).
5. Since 2001, same-sex couples have gained marriage rights in Argentina, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain and Sweden. In
the USA, same-sex couples have marriage rights in Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, Washington and the District of Colum-
bia, though such couples are not recognized as a matter of federal law.
6. See, for example, the July 2009 exchange between the sex columnist and gay rights activist
Dan Savage (2009) and the Discovery Institute fellow and BeliefNet blogger David Klinghof-
fer (2009).
7. See, for example, the Manhattan Declaration (2009). Opposition to homosexuality has also
become part of international evangelism work by some conservative American Christians, as
the connection between American missionaries and Uganda’s proposed anti-homosexuality bill
demonstrates (Gettleman, 2010).
8. Among those who publicly took this stand were Archbishop Raymond Burke of Saint
Louis, Bishop Joseph Galante of Camden, NJ, Bishop Michael Sheridan of Colorado
Springs and Bishop Fabian Bruskewitz of Lincoln, NE (Wakin, 2004: A12). Archbishop
Burke later said that even voting for a pro-choice candidate was a sin (Kirkpatrick and
Goodstein, 2004), apparently with the support and encouragement of then-Cardinal Joseph
Ratzinger (Toner, 2005). More recently, Bishop Thomas Tobin of Rhode Island asked US
Rep. Patrick Kennedy to refrain from communion because of Kennedy’s pro-choice polit-
ical views (Urbina, 2009).
9. I say ‘may have been’ here only because I am not an expert on Roman Catholic ecclesiology and
am not making a judgment as to whether their decisions were, on the Church’s own terms, a
legitimate exercise of church authority. Roman Catholic Church leaders themselves were
divided on this question. Cardinal RogerMahony of Los Angeles, for example, opposed denying
communion to pro-choice politicians, arguing that church teaching ‘places the duty on each
Catholic to examine their consciences as to their worthiness to receive holy communion. That
is not the role of the person distributing the body and blood of Christ’ (Goodstein, 2004: A1).
10. Of course, such identity struggles occur not just with respect to hot-button issues of morality,
like human sexuality and reproduction. In July 2009, for example, Pope Benedict XVI issued a
new encyclical reinterpreting the Roman Catholic doctrine of love in light of new challenges
presented by global capitalism (Benedict XVI, 2009).
11. Elster (1998) and Dryzek (2002) go further and argue that such ‘hypocrisy’ may even be use-
ful, since publicity means that democratic actors can be held to their stated reasons, even if
hypocritical. Hypocrisy thus potentially has a moderating effect.
12. The state legislatures of Vermont, New Hampshire, New York and Maine approved same-sex
marriage, as did the DC City Council. In Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa and California,
same-sex marriage rights were granted judicially. In California and Maine, these rights were
later repealed via voter referenda. In 2012, voters in Maine, Maryland and Washington voted
to legalize same-sex marriage in popular referenda.
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13. References are from transcripts of debate, as recorded in the Maine Legislative Record (Maine
House Legislative Record, 2009; Maine Senate Legislative Record, 2009).
14. As Chambers notes, Habermas is keen to maintain a ‘healthy distance’ between philosophy and
theology (2007: 212). The most important difference is that philosophy must be committed to
methodological atheism, whereas theology cannot avoid using religious language to explain
faith (Habermas, 2002: 74–5).
15. This literature is extensive and diverse. For recent contributions see, among others, Berger
(1999), Bruce (2002), Casanova (1994), Stark (1999) and Stark and Finke (2000).
16. Asad’s writings are part of a growing body of scholarship on the political dimension of
religion. In addition to Asad (1993, 2003), see Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000), Timothy Fitzgerald
(2000, 2007), Russell McCutcheon (1997), Derek Peterson and Darren Walhof (2002), and
Peter van der Veer (2001).
17. Charles Taylor’s recent book similarly contests the ‘subtraction account’ of the uncovering of
the secular through the removal of religion (2007).
18. See also Asad’s analysis of the much-discussed ‘scarf affair’ in France, in which he asks:
‘How does the secular state address the pain of people who are obliged to give up part of their
religious heritage to show that they are acceptable? The simple answer is: by expecting them
to take beliefs lightly’ (2006: 103).
19. See also the historian Peter van der Veer’s argument that Habermas fails to recognize that
religion has been and remains crucial for the constitution of the public sphere (2001: 24–8).
20. As Maeve Cooke points out, it is odd for Habermas to restrict the acceptable reasons that can
be offered in the institutional public sphere since it undermines his own long-standing empha-
sis on the transformative power of deliberation. In Cooke’s view, his translation requirement
underplays the complexity of transformative discourse and ignores the fact that transformation
is more likely to happen with participants of different perspectives (2007: 228–9).
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